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UNION POWERS AND WORKERS' RIGHTS*

Clyde W. Summerst
N January I, 1944, the Trailmobile Company of Cincinnati absorbed the Highland Body Manufacturing Company, taking over
all of its assets and business. All of the Highland equipment was
moved to the T railmobile plant, and all Highland employees were
transferred to the T railmobile payroll. The Highland workers claimed
seniority as of their dates of employment with Highland, but the Trailmobile workers insisted that the Highland men were new employees as
of the date of transfer. Since both groups were affiliated with the A.F.
of L., the dispute was submitted to national representatives of the A.F.
of L. When they held in favor of the Highland group, the T railmobile
employees, who outnumbered the Highland employees ten to one, immediately reorganized into a C.I.O. local and petitioned for an N.L.
R.B. election.1 The new C.I.O. local, of course, won and immediately
negotiated a contract providing that seniority of Highland employees
should date from January I, 1944.
This contract brought forth a series of suits by Highland workers
seeking protection of their seniority status. One of them, Hess, brought
a class suit in the Ohio courts to compel the union to restore him and
his fellow workers to their seniority rights. The Ohio court refused
to give relief, holding that seniority rights arose solely from contract,
and the union was empowered as the certified representative to fix those
rights by the collective agreement. 2 A second suit was brought by a returned veteran, Whirls, who claimed that because of this clause he had
been demoted in violation of his rights under the Selective Service Act.
He, too, failed to obtain relief in the courts.3 In the meantime, the
union retaliated by expelling Whirls for conduct unbecoming a union
member and demanding his discharge under the closed shop contract.
Not daunted, the Highland employees brought still another action in

O

"' Paper delivered at the Institute on The Law and Labor-Management Relations sponsored by the University of Michigan Law School, June 26-July 1, 1950.-Ed.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo School of Law.-Ed.
1 Matter of Trailer Company, 51 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1943). The board held that the
motive for shifting affiliation and seeking an election was beyond its province.
2 Hess v. Trailer Co., 17 Ohio Supp. 39, 31 Ohio Op. 566 (1944). Motion to certify
record to the Ohio Supreme Court overruled, 31 Ohio Law Rep. 51, 18 Ohio Bar 314.
3 Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 67 S.Ct. 982 (1947). The demotion had
occurred more than one year after his return from service, and there was no evidence that
he had been discriminated against because of his status. Therefore, there was no violation
of the Selective Service Act.
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the federal courts, this time to enjoin enforcement of the seniority
clause as discriminatory and in violation of the union's duty to represent them fairly. The circuit court of appeals denied relief, holding
that this "discrimination was in pursuance of the bargaining process,
and was not without some basis." The Highland men should not complain, said the court, for they had obtained the closed shop (in the
C.I.O.) and other "advantages."4
The plight of the Highland group is not the product of labor
strife, but of collective bargaining; not of employer discrimination, but
of union power. It symbolizes in an extreme form the potential fate of
an individual worker within the structure of unionization and collective
bargaining. It sharply reminds us that contracts apply to workers,
and that unions consist of members. It warns us that we must not become so obsessed with the glamor of studying mass action that we ignore
the fate of those who make up the mass and in whose name the action
is taken.
Such cases as the T railmobile case compel us to give careful attention and serious study to the place of the individual within our collective
bargaining system. Since the union represents the worker's interests,
and is designated as his spokesman, this is primarily a problem of the
relationship of the union to the individual worker. In considering this
problem, it will be helpful to view the relationship in two different
lights: first, the power of the union to affect or regulate the life of the
individual; and second, the right of the individual to control or limit
the union's exercise of that power.

I
The Union's Power Over the Individual
Unions are first and foremost collective bargaining agencies. Their
principal function is to speak for workers in negotiating terms of employment, to exercise the collective strength of workers in obtaining
concessions, and to bind the workers by making collective contracts.
The union's power over the individual, therefore, is measured largely
by the impact which its bargaining has on the economic life of the
employee. The force of this impact depends upon two separate factors: the breadth of bargaining-that is, the number of terms of employment ~hich a union defines by its agreement; and the power of
binding representation-that is, the ·degree to which an individual is
4

Trailmobile Co. v. Britt, (6th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 569.

1951 ]

UNION POWERS AND WORKERS' R.IGIITS

807

bound by his union's decisions and is compelled to speak only through
his union.

A. The Breadth of Bargaining
The area of bargaining varies so greatly from industry to industry,
from union to union, and from employer to employer that accurate
generalizations are impossible. However, a quick look at some of the
more customary contract provisions will suffice to illustrate the extensive
powers which unions exercise over the economic welfare of individual
workers.
First, unions bargain to determine who shall work. Most commonly
known are the closed shop, union preference, or hiring hall agreements. 5 Far more significant, however, is the common seniority clause.
Although it does not control who shall be hired in the first instance, it
rigidly controls the order in which individuals shall be laid off. Furthermore, by requiring recall of employees on layoff before new hirings,
seniority may severely limit the job opportunities of new workers seeking to enter the trade. 6 In short the seniority clause which the union
obtains determines who shall work and who shall not.
Second, unions bargain to determine the amount of wages each
employee will receive. The collective contract governs not only the
level of wages, but customarily provides for a complex wage structure
with wide differentials between job classifications, automatic increases
and premium pay. Under the Portal-to-Portal Act and recent amendments to the Wage-Hour Act, the union by bargaining may even create
or destroy statutory rights to overtime pay. 7
5 Although these have been outlawed by the Labor Management Relations Act, and
either prohibited or seriously restricted in 19 states, they are still continued by subterfuge
in many instances. See Hogan, "The Meaning of Union Shop Elections,'' 1 hm. LAB.
REL. REv. 319 (1949); Zorn, "New Union Responsibilities," FmST A.NNuAL CoNI'ERENCE
ON LABOR RELATIONS AT NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY 303 (1948).
6 In 1946, it was almost impossible for a newcomer to obtain a job in the auto industry,
because many who had acquired seniority during the war were still laid off. The contract
negotiated in May, 1950 between the United Auto Workers and Chrysler Corporation
provides that a worker on lay-off retains his seniority for a period equal to his length of
service. The company agrees, as far as practicable, to recall seniority employees before
hiring new employees. Thus, the ability to get a job at Chrysler, especially during slack
times, is practically nil.
7 Under the Portal to Portal Act, §4(b), time spent in preliminary or postliminary
activities, such as walking to and from work, is not to be included in computing overtime
unless that time is compensable by contract, custom, or agreement. Thus, a union, by
obtaining a provision which requires pay for travel time, creates a statutory right to overtime pay. See Tyson, "Effect of 1947 Portal to Portal Act," REPORT OI! FmsT ANNuAL
CoNI!ERENCE ON LABoR RELATIONS AT NEw YoRK UNIVERSITY 541 at 566 (1948).
The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended in 1949, provides in §3(o) that in determining hours worked, time spent in changing clothes shall be excluded if excluded by
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Third, ·the union helps govern the individual every hour of his
working day. The contract sets shift hours which call him to work, describes job classifications which define his work, and provides the offenses for which he may be disciplined. Through the union's grievance
procedure he can protest against dangerous machines, poor ventilation,
or overbearing foremen. If he is discharged the union can seek his
reinstatement.
The power of the union is not confined to bargaining for his working hours, but may extend to his fireside and even to his grave. If he becomes temporarily disabled, he may receive disability payments. If
his children become sick, they may receive free hospital care; when he
becomes too old to work, he obtains a $ I 00 a month pension; and when
he dies, his wife collects the insurance-all of this obtained for him by
the union acting as his representative in collective bargaining. 8
The union's. power to bargain does not give it unrestrained power to
govern the terms and conditions of employment, for management must
agree to those terms. However, the union does make significant policy
decisions which vitally affect every employee. The United Mine
Workers have had to choose between foregoing wage increases or risking serious curtailment of work, just as many unions during the depression had to choose between wage cuts and mass lay-offs.9 The Steel
Workers had to choose between wage increases and a pension plan, and
the Auto Workers at General Motors had to choose between a flat increase and a cost .of living formula. In bargaining, demands for skilled
workers may be reduced to obtain larger increases for .unskilled workers,
custom, practice or bona fide collective agreement. Sections 7(b)(l) and 7(b)(2) excuse
overtime payments on guaranteed wage contracts if the contract is made by a certified
bargaining agent. The overtime-on-overtime amendment provides that shift premiums shall
not be included in computing the regular rate, if the premium is established by a collective
bargaining agreement. §7(d).
8 In 1948 over 3,000,000 workers were covered under health and welfare contracts,
and many others have· become covered since that time. Auto, coal, clothing, electrical
machinery, steel and textile are almost completely covered by such provisions. Many other
industries such as construction, furniture, fur, leather, paper, and rubber hav7 substantial
amounts.
The scope of these provisions is indicated by the new contract between United Auto
Workers and Chrysler Corporation which provides hospitalization, surgical benefits, temporary disability payments of $28 a week for 26 weeks, permanent disability payments of
$50 a month for 6 years, life insurance of $3,600 and $100 a month pension at 65 for
those having 25 years service.
9 In 1931 the Hosiery Workers took a 30% to 45% wage cut, when, as George 'l'aylor
put it, they had to chose between wage cuts and unemployment. This was bitterly opposed
by a strong minority of the rank and file. TWENTIETH CBNTURY FuND, How CoLLBCTIVE
BARGAINING WoRKS 484 (1942). A comparable problem faced the railroad brotherhoods
during the depression when they had to decide whether they should share the reduced work
or reduce the number of employees. Bitterness and internal dissension resulted, with the
older men finally winning and eliminating most of the workshai:ing. Id. at 355.
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merit increases may be surrendered for promotion by semonty, and
plant-wide seniority may be obtained at the expense of job transfer
privileges. The total concessions which can be obtained at the bargaining table are limited, but the union has a substantial power of
choice between possible alternatives. 10 The union's· choice determines
the worker's welfare. If the concessions are inadequate the union has
a more drastic decision to make--whether to surrender or to strike. The
union decides whether the individual shall forego his claim for future
pensions or sacrifice his present savings. As the strike progresses, it is
the union which decides whether the claims shall be compromised or
further sacrifices required.
The extensive power of unions to regulate the lives of individuals
does not arise solely from the union's own strength. The Railway Labor
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and similar state statutes provide affirmative legal protection for organizational activity and collective action.11 The Norris-La Guardia Act protects unions from labor
injunctions,1 2 and the Supreme Court has freed them from the strictures
of the anti-trust laws. 13
Unions are not only shielded by the armor of the law, but are armed
with the authority of government.14 Under the Wagner Act and other
10 One of the longest standing policy problems has been incentive pay plans. Sidney
Hillman waged a long £ght for piece work in the clothing industry. Although strongly
opposed by much of the membership, he was £nally able to make piece work the established
pattern in the industry. On the other hand the leadership of the Auto Workers bas vigorously objected to any form of incentive pay and has insisted on straight hourly rates.
TWENnETII CENTURY FUND, How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Wonxs 423, 612 (1942);
BARllASH, LABon UNIONS IN AcnoN 70-71 (1948). See generally, KENNEDY, UNION
Poucms AND lNcENTIVE WAGE 1\1:Eni:ons (1945).
11 Nine states have statutes which give unions substantially the same protection and
authority as the National Labor Relations Act, although some of them also regulate other
aspects of labor relations. These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin. See Kn.LINGSWORTH,
STATE LABon RELATIONS Ac:rs (1948).
12 Seventeen states have also enacted anti-injunction legislation modeled upon the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. These include the major industrial states of Connecticut, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
1a See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941) and Hunt v.
Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 65 S.Ct. 1545 (1945). However, unions are not protected if
they combine with the employer to restrain trade. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.
3, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775 (1947).
14 Not all collective bargaining is carried on within the jurisdiction of a labor relations
act. No £gures are available to indicate the precise percentage. However, the broad reach of
federal power, and the presence of state statutes in some of the most heavily populated
areas preclude that percentage from being very large. Furthermore, the Wagner Act bas
established a pattern of bargaining which is followed almost exclusively in practice. The
principle of exclusive representation by the majority union, with which we are most con•
cerned here, is the fust premise of collective bargaining in this country. It has been esti·
mated that bargaining for members affects less than 1% of all those under union contract.
WILLIAMSON AND HAruus, TRENDS IN CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 40 (1945).
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labor relations acts, they are designated by government as instruments
for effectuating broad social policies and economic regulation. The
National Labor Relations Board, by defining the appropriate bargaining unit, allocates the industrial territory for the exercise of union
power. By officially certifying a union, the board constitutes it the
statutory representative of all employees in the unit and vests it with
the power to bargain for those employees. The board then compels the
employer, under threat of severe penalties, to meet with the union and
bargain in good faith. 111 The employer is barred from establishing terms
of employment unilaterally, but must first negotiate with the union.16
Within a wide but yet undefined area, he is compelled to share with the
union the power of making any decisions affecting employees.17 Thus,
in the Allison case, the employer was required to consult with the union
before granting merit increases;18 and in the Inland Steel ca_se he was
compelled to permit union participation in deciding the operation of an
employer-sponsored pension plan. 19 Furthermore, the union can demand that the employer divulge information as to employment prac15 Although the employer is not required to make concessions or reach an agreement,
he must discuss the issues. If he does not make counter-proposals indicating to what he
will agree, he runs serious risk of an unfair labor practice charge. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Montgomery Ward and Co., (9th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 676. That this may approach
compelling agreement, see Ward, "Mechanics of Collective Bargaining," 53 HARV. L. REv.
754 (1940); 26 VA. L. REv. 769 (1940); Smith, "The Evolution of the 'Duty to Bargain'
Concept in American Law," 39 M:rca. L. REv. 1065 (1941).
16 In May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 66 S.Ct. 203 (1945) the
employer was found guilty of an unfair labor practice charge because he petitioned the War
Labor Board for a wage increase without first bargaining with the union. Even though the
employer reaches an impasse with the union, he cannot make unilateral changes substantially different from those offered to the union. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.,
337 U.S. 217, 69 S.Ct. 960 (1949). See note, ''Employer By-Passing of Designated Bargaining Agent," 27 N.C. L. REv. 266 (1949); Weyand, "Scope of Bargaining Under
Taft-Hartley," FrnsT ANNuAL CoNFERENCE ON LAlloR RELATIONS, NEw YoRK UNIVER·
SITY 257, 266 (1948).
17 George W. Taylor has said, "Workers join unions to give them the prerogative of
interfering with the manner in which management operates its business.•••" Transcript,
CoNFERENCE ON TRAINING OP LAw STUDENTS IN LAlloR RELATIONS Vol. 1, p. 24 (1947).
Similarly, Professor Chamberlain has said, "Collective bargaining, at least in some areas, is
now ripening into a method of management in the firm •... We have been particularly
loathe to accept the fact that union leaders • • • are now exercising the managerial functions.•••" Chamberlain, "Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract," 48 CoL. L.
REv. 829 at 845-6 (1948).
1s NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 766.
19Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 247. This pension plan
had been inaugurated by the company and administered solely by the company for over ten
years, before the union protested its operation and demanded that the company bargain
concerning changes. In W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, (1st Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 875
it was held that the employer must also bargain concerning group health and accident insurance. See also 58 YALE L. J. 803 (1949) for discussion of the scope of bargaining.
For a vigorous criticism of these cases, see Cox and Dunlop, "Regulation of Collective
Bargaining by the N.L.R.B.,'' 63 HA:av. L. REv. 389 (1950).
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tices, merit increases, and wage payrnents. 20 Unions, in bargaining, are
not private organizations but are governmental agencies garbed with the
cloak of legal authority to represent all employees in the unit and
armed with the legal right to participate in all decisions affecting terms
and conditions of employment.
B. Binding Representation
The impact of the union upon an individual lies not only in the
wide range of its bargaining, but in the tightness with which its decisions bind the individual. The union's grant of power lies in section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides: "Representatives designated ... by the majority of employees in a unit ...
shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in such unit for
purposes of collective bargaining...."
The completeness of the union's power to bind individuals is indicated by three Supreme Court decisions. In J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
the Court held that the union's power to bargain could not be limited
by prior contracts made in good faith between the employer and the
individual. 21 The union's power was supreme, and though the individual may still contract for matters beyond the union's scope, the breadth
of union power leaves small room for individual bargaining. In Order
of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, the union had
made a contract providing that each telegrapher be paid for each car of
fruit switched at his station. Because of re-routing, this resulted in
exorbitant payments to some telegraphers. To correct this, the employer made agreements with individual employees to establish new
rates which would yield the amount contemplated by the contract. The
court held these agreements invalid. 22 The union's power to bargain
extended not only to general standards, but to each employee's peculiar
20 NLRB v. J. H. Allison & Co., (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 766; B. F. Goodrich
Co., 89 N.L.R.B. No. 139 (1950); Electric Auto-Lite Company, 89 N.L.R.B. No. 145
(19'i0); Yawman and Erbe Mfg. Co., 89 N.LR.B. No. 108 (1950).
21321 U.S. 332 at 338, 339, 64 S.Ct. 576 (1944). Justice Jackson emphatically stated
the subservience of individuals to collective bargaining. "The very purpose of providing by •
statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare
of the group••••
''The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that of the
group, to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result."
22 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 64
S.Ct. 582 (1944). The back pay award amounted to $40,000 for one employee, and from
$200 to $2,000 for the others.
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situation.23 Only through the union could any changes in terms of
employment be made. In Medo Photo Supply Corp. 11. NLRB,24 a
majority of the employees attempted to ignore the union and meet with
the employer as a group to negotiate an agreement. The court held
that so long as a union is the designated bargaining agent, no agreement
can be made except through that union. 25 It is not the majority but
the designated union which holds the bargaining power.
In short, these cases hold that a union which has been designated
as bargaining agent can destroy individual contracts made previously,
even though made in good faith; it can void individual contracts made
subsequently, even though made to adjust contract terms to fit special
needs; and it can prevent the employer from negotiating any agreement
with a group of his employees, even though they constitute a majority. 26
This power of the union continues so long as it is the designated
agent. If it is not certified, the employees may be able to escape by revoking their authorization before a contract is made. 27 If it is certified,
under section 9(c)(3) it has an irrevocable power for one year and
can be unseated only by new representation proceedings.28 Whether
certified or not, if the union obtains a contract, its irrevocable power may
be extended as long as three years. 29 Whether the union is still ap23 This power of the union over the individual was further extended in the Allison
case, (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 766, where the court held that the employer was compelled to bargain with the union concerning merit increases.
24 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944).
25 "Bargaining carried on by the employer directly with the employees, whether a
minority or majority, who have not revoked their designation of a bargaining agent, would
be subversive of the mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained. • ••"
321 U.S. 678 at 684, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944).
26 For an excellent discussion of the importance of the majority rule principle in collective bargaining and its application under the National Labor Relations Act,·see Weyand,
"Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining," 45 CoL. L. REv. 556 (1945).
27 In the Medo case, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944) the Court implied that if the
employees had voluntarily withdrawn their authorizations without any pressure from the
employer, then the employer could have by-passed the union and dealt directly with the
employees.
28 The representation proceeding may arise either out of a petition by another union
for certification, or a petition by the employees for de-certification under §9(c)(l)(B).
29 In its first decisions, the board held that a contract for one year would bar an election. It later held that a two-year contract would bar an election where contracts of such
duration were customary in the industry. In Matter of Reed Roller Bit, 72 N.L.R.B. 927
(1947) it held that a two-year contract would automatically bar an election even though not
customary. In Matter of Califomia Walnut Growers, 77 N.L.R.B. 756 (1948) it held a
three-year contract a bar where such contracts were customary.
The certification bar and the contract bar may be combined to extend further the
union's power. In Matter of Quaker Maid Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 915 (1946) the union renewed
and extended its contract 10 months after certification. The board held this new contract
negotiated within a year after certification was a bar to further representation proceedings.
See Murdock, "Some Aspects of Employee Democracy Under the Wagner Act," 32 CoRN.
L.Q. 73 (1946); Cushman, "The Duration of Certifications by the N.L.R.B. and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability," 45 MrCH. L. REv. I (1946).
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proved by the majority is irrelevant.30 Its power continues. The significance of the one-year rule and the contract bar doctrine is that, like the
Medo case, they point an unerring finger at the locus of power. The
power to bargain is not vested in the majority, but in the union as an
entity wholly apart from the governed employees.
It is, of course, true that the union must have been authorized by a
majority of the employees in the unit. With rare exceptions it continues
to represent the majority. However, this does not lessen its impact on
the lives of individuals, for its decisions bind both majority and minority alike. The Highland group at T railmobile learned to their sorrow
that a union could, by collective bargaining, drastically alter or destroy
an individual's seniority rights and the courts would give no relief.
Although these rights are the very foundation of a man's right to his
job and have been acquired by many years of work, they are subservient
to union power.31
Thus far we have dealt only with the union's power to bind the
individual by negotiation of an agreement. However, the union's
control does not end here. The contract requires constant interpretation and day-to-day appl~cation; it has gaps which require further negotiation; and it is not self-enforcing but calls for constant vigilance to
insure that every employee enjoys full rights. The primary instrument
for additions, interpretations, and enforcement is the grievance machinery, and that machinery is completely controlled by the union. The individual files his complaint with the union steward, it is appealed
through a union shop committee, is pleaded by union officers, and is
arbitrated before a union-approved arbitrator. The individual's claim
may be surrendered or compromised by the union at any step.32 His
relief is largely dependent on the union's enthusiasm for his cause.
so Where there has been a schism in the union, or the local has seceded from the international so that the identity of the union is in d6ubt, then the board will conduct an election. Matter of Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 990 (1941); Matter of Jasper
Wood Products Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1947). It is in carrying out this policy that the
board has recently conducted a number of elections among electrical workers where there
has been a split between the U.E. and the I.U.E.
31 The power of the union to alter seniority rights has never been seriously questioned.
See for example Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. 201,
277 N.W. 885 (1938); Elder v. New York Central R. Co., (6th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d)
361; Llewellyn v. Fleming, (10th Cir. 1945) 154 F. (2d) 211; Christenson, "Seniority
Rights Under Labor Union Agreements," (1937) 11 TEMPLE L.Q. 355 (1937); 47 YALB
L.J. 73 (1937); "Seniority Clauses in Labor Contracts," 32 lowA L. fuv. 107 (1946).
However, the seniority individual can insist on the rights provided by the contract, and they
cannot be destroyed except by an amendment made by the authorized persons and in the
authorized manner. Gregg v. Stark, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459 (1920); Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923); McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt
Ry. Co., 229 Mo. App. 506, 77 S.W. (2d) 175 (1934).
32 The union's power over the individual through the grievance procedure can scarcely
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The union, however, does not have exclusive .right to negotiate
and settle all grievances. In Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, the
Supreme Court held that under the Railway Labor Act the union
could not make a binding settlement of an employee's claim under the
contract without his consent.33 The individual had a right to negotiate
his own grievance with the employer, and to appeal it himself to final
determination by the Adjustment Board.34 The Taft-Hartley Act, in
section 9(a), expressly reserves to an employee the right to present grievances and have them adjusted without intervention by the majority
union. 35 By implication, this too would bar the union from making a
binding settlement without the employee's consent. 36
This right of the individual must not be over-estimated, for it is
hedged about with both legal and practical restrictions. First, individual
grievances cannot alter the terms of the agreement; they can only enbe overstated. The union may refuse to handle an individual's grievance at all, leaving him
to his own devices. See, for example, Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, (5th Cir. 1945) 147 F.
(2d) 69. The union may be less obvious and simply not press the matter, accepting any
settlement the company may tender. Even with the best of intentions the union may fail
to present the grievance in its strongest light.
83 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282 (1945), affd. on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661, 66 S.Ct.
721 (1946). On rehearing the Court said that consent of the individual might be obtained
through the union constitution and by-laws to which he became bound by joining the union,
through express consent when he submitted the grievance or through implied consent by
standing silent when he had notice or knowledge of pending settlement. However, consent
cannot be implied from the bare fact that the individual submitted his grievance to the
union grievance procedure, or from mere membership in the union.
84 If the individual does not wish to appeal to the Railway Adjustment Board, he may
bring suit in the federal or state, courts. However, the suit can be only for damages for
:violation of vested rights, such as damages for wrongful discharge. Moore v. ill. Cent. R.
Co., 312 U.S. 630, 61 S.Ct. 754 (1941). Suit cannot be brought for interpretations involving future relations of the parties. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70
S.Ct. 577 (1950).
85 "Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment
is not inconsistent ·with the terms of the collective bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect: Provided further, that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment."
86 There is serious question whether under the Railway Labor Act or the Labor Management Relations Act an individual can be represented by a minority union in processing
his grievance. In the Hughes Tool case, (5th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 69 arising under
the N.L.R.B. before 1947, the court held that he could not be so represented. Following
the Burley case the Attorney General ruled that a railroad employee was entitled to
minority representation. 40 OP. Arn. GEN. 494 (1946). Last year, Judge Learned Hand
held that under the Taft-Hartley Act, the employees were not only entitled to be represented by a minority union but that such a union could picket the employer for his failure
to deal with it. Douds v. Retail Stores Union, (2d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 764. However,
there is still a strong argument that the Taft-Hartley changes were intended only to enact
the Hughes Tool doctrine. 'See Sherman, "The Individual and his Grievance-Whose
Grievance Is It?" 11 UNiv. PrIT. L. REv. 35 (1949).
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force existing provisions oi deal with matters not covered by the agreement.37 Second, the majority union can negotiate an amendment or an
addition to the contract and thereby nullify the grievance except when
it involves accrued money claims. Third, the majority union is entitled
to be present and can object to the grievance or any disposition which
the employer proposes. 38 This means that the individual faces the
serious practical difficulty of overcoming the objections of both the employer and the majority union. Although the union does not have
exclusive power over grievances, the individual's rights are so narrow,
and his bargaining position so weak, that for all practical purposes he is
subject to the union-controlled grievance procedure.39

C. The Nature of Union Power
Enough has been said to indicate the breadth and depth of union
power. As collective bargaining agents, unions help determine when a
man shall work, what he shall do, how much he shall make, when he
shall have holidays and the terms on which he shall retire. As exclusive
representative, the union alone speaks for him in obtaining these terms,
and he can speak only through the union. Even his personal grievances
are not free of the union's controlling hand.
It is now necessary to state more explicitly the nature of union
power. A union, in bargaining, acts as the representative of all workers
within an industrial area. It weighs alternatives and determines policies which vitally affect all those whom it represents. It negotiates a
contract which becomes the basic law of that industrial community. In
making those laws, the union acts as the worker's economic legislature.
After the laws have been made, the union is charged with their en37 In the Burley case, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282 (1945), Rutledge distinguished
disputes over grievances and disputes over the making of collective agreements. Grievances
relate "either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference
to a specific situation or to an omitted case.'' (p. 723) Judge Hand interpreted this to mean
that grievances included disputes for which no existing collective agreement has attempted
to settle. Douds v. Retail Stores Union, (2d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 764 at 771.
38 Whether the union is entitled not ouly to be present at the adjustment but also to
protest the settlement of the grievance by a counter grievance is left in doubt. See Cox,
"Some Aspects of The Labor Management Relations Act," 61 HARv. L. R:Ev. 274, 301
(1948); Shugerman, "Individual E~ployee Grievances Under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts," 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 154 (1949). However, the right of the union to know of grievances and be present gives it ample opportunity to make its objections known.
30 The weakness of individual grievances is partially evidenced by their small number.
In NLRB v. North American Aviation, (9th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 898 the employer
notified all employees that they could present grievances direct to management. In spite of
this announcement, only two grievances had been handled on an individual basis while
800 had been handled by the union.
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forcement, and through its grievance procedure helps judge their interpretation and application. It is the worker's policeman and judge. The
union is, in short, the employee's economic government. The union's
power is the power to govern. Only if we fully appreciate this cardinal
fact and keep it clearly in mind can we critically evaluate the rights
which an individual should have within the union.
All of the foregoing has emphasized the submergence of the individual under a tide of organizational control. This does not, however,
constitute a criticism of collective bargaining nor a denial of the propriety of union power. The submergence of the individual came not with
the Wagner Act in 1935, but with the industrial revolution in 1800;
for it was not unions but the factory system which destroyed the individuality of the worker. In an industrial economy with large scale production and a chronic scarcity of jobs, the individual's power to bargain
for himself became an empty fiction. Concentrations of capital, made
possible by the corporate structure, placed in the hands of employers
the power to determine who should work and at what wage. The employer's word was law. The worker retained full freedom-to submit
or starve. The advent of unions has not changed the inescapable character of modem industry that an individual's economic life is governed
by forces beyond himself. Collective bargaining does not alter the
amount of power which is exercised over the individual. It only shifts
its source.
With the question of whether unions have obtained ·too much
power we are not here concerned. Our problem is not how much power
the union should have, but how it shall be exercised. What rights
should an individual have in the union which acts as his economic
government? What responsibilities does the union owe to those for
whom it bargains? These are the principal problems with which we
are now concerned.

II
Individual Rights Within the Union

A. Standards of Union Government
The moment we recognize that the power to bargain is the power to
govern, we immediately leap to the conclusion that unions should exercise that power democratically. Because of our heritage, we almost
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automatically assume that individuals should have a voice in the decisions which directly affect them. 40
·
Before we make the easy assumption that unions should be democratic and impose upon them special standards of conduct, we need to
inspect more closely the soil from which they spring and the climate in
which they grow. We need to recognize the tug of conflicting forces
to which they are subject, and we need to understand more clearly why
we expect them to be democratic.
We must recognize that the economic soil from which unions
spring has been almost barren of ·democratic practices. Management's
labor policies have never been democratically controlled. Certainly
major policies have not customarily been submitted to the affected employees for vote; neither have they been submitted to the stockholders
for their vote. 41 Corporate officers are theoretically elected by stockholders and are responsible to them. However, the concentration of
many shares in a few hands, the widespread use of proxies, and the
development of various financial devices have stripped from the majority of shareholders any effective voice and have centered control in a
managerial class which exercises almost unlimited power to choose policies and enforce rules. 42 In the management of business, as contrasted
40 Professor Slichter resolved the problem with the simple assertion, "Democracy is
needed in trade unions because there is room for great differences among members in the
objectives of unions, in their policies, and in the ways in which they conduct their affairs."
CHALI.ENGB OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 100 (1947).
41 When several companies during the past year suggested that they would grant pension demands if those demands were approved by a vote of their stockholders, the suggestion
was so novel as to call forth extended comment in the public press. During the unionbusting days of the '30's, few stockholders even knew of their company's policies. When
some anti-union practices became so notorious, stockholders who objected were completely
ignored. Co01rn AND MURRAY, ORGANIZED LAlloR AND PRODUCTION 53, 251 (1946).
In Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E. (2d) 305 (1947) a group of stockholders
in Remington Rand brought suit against their officers because of dismantling and moving
plants to destroy the union. The petition alleged that assets had been wasted with no purpose but to break the law. The court held the complaint stated a good cause of action because it alleged unlawful conduct. As Professor Chamberlain has pointed out, the legal
limitations on the board's powers have been only with respect to the purpose and intent
of the actions taken under almost limitless powers. CHAMBBRLAIN, THB UNION CHALLBNGB
TO MANAGBMBNT CONTROL 12-13 (1948).
4 2 ''The stockholder is therefore left as a matter of law with little more than the loose
expectation that a group of men under a nominal duty to run the enterprise for his benefit
and that of others like him, will actually observe this obligation. . .. Only in extreme cases
will their judgment as to what is or is not to his interests be interfered with•••.
''The only example of a similar subjection of economic interests of the individual to
those of a group which appears to the writers as being at all comparable, is that contained
in the Communist system." BERLB AND MEANs, THB MoDERN CORPORATION AND PmvATB
PROPERTY 277-8 (1932).
"In most large corporations . . . the bulk of stockholders, holding in their name the
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with the management of government, we demand efficiency, not democracy; instant obedience, not freedom of protest; productivity, not
individual participation.43 When we demand that unions, which sit
across the table from management, maintain democratic procedures,
we are demanding a double standard. We seek flowers where only
weeds have grown.
An obvious obstacle to union democracy is that the union has to
maintain itself in a climate which is hostile to its existence and its objectives. Unions have had to struggle for survival against deadly attacks by employers who did not hesitate to use spies, bribery, intimidation, or even physical violence to destroy them. Although large segments of management have fully accepted collective bargaining, antiunion practices are not dead, and the old fears remain. Even though the
employer accepts the union, much of collective bargaining is .carried
on with the prospect of an ultimate deadlock and a resort to economic
force. The state of siege, the cold war, and the strike d.o not provide a
healthy climate for the growth of democratic processes.44
Finally, the need for democracy within a particular union is somewhat tempered by the existence of competing unions. If members are
not free to correct the policies of their union from within, they can
i:evolt and overthrow it in a board election. This right of revolution
is meaningful, however, only if there is available a competing union
of comparable strength. Decertification is merely a surrender to the
employer of the right of self-government; and an independent union
without bargaining strength maintains only the form of freedom. Although there are actively competing unions in many industries -and
majority of the shares of stock, have, as every one knows, the passive relation to the company which has been referred to. With only the rarest exceptions, they exercise no real
control over the company. . • ." BuRNHAM, THB MANAGERIAL REvoLUTION 85 (1941).
43 There is no substantial evidence that management prefers to deal with democratic
unions. In numerous instances employers have cooperated ,vith dictatorial leadership to
help them maintain control. Democracy may be turbulent and disruptive while management
seeks stability and discipline. Preference may arise for unions which hold a firm grip on
, their members and can act as middlemen in supplying labor.
44 Professor Slichter has well said, "A trade union may be compared to a national
government which is engaged in the main in foreign relations. • • . While the community
can afford processes in the body politic which emphasize differences, at least in domestic
affairs, unions must emphasize agreement." SucHTBR, CHALLENGE OF hrousTRIAL RELATIONS 22 (1947).
The language of the strike is itself reflective of the battle spirit with ultimatums, tactical maneuvers, defense fun~, strike lieutenants, and Hying squadrons. See SELBKMAN,
l.ABoR RELATIONS AND HuMAN RELATIONS 18 (1947).
A. J. Muste, under the telling title "Army and Town Meeting" has vividly described
the difficult problem of maintaining an organization to Jight strike .battles and yet use town
meeting procedure. See B ~ AND KERR, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC 187 (1948).
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trades, substantial areas ~uch as construction, printing, trucking, mining, and railroading are monopolized by unchallenged unions. 45 The
presence of a competing union not only reduces the need for internal
democracy, but tends to encourage internal democracy. The very
threat of a rival compels a union to permit its members more freedom
and to be more responsive to their desires. On the other hand, where the
need for democracy is the greatest, the incentives to provide it are the
smallest. It is no accident that the most dictatorial unions are those unchallenged by rivals ..
The foregoing discussion is not meant to imply that unions should
not, cannot, or need not be democratic. It is intended only to suggest
conditions whfoh militate against the demands for internal democracy.
In spite of these conditions, there are impelling reasons why unions
should be democratic. First, their extensive power to regulate the lives
of workers is largely derived from government through laws which provide them protection ap.d grant them authority. 46 In the exercise of the
power thus granted to them, they should be required to maintain the
same standards which would be required of government itself.47
4CI In the three-month period between Januai:y 1 and March 31, 1950, National Labor
Relations Board elections were held in 1,243 units. In 1,009 the choice was between one
union and no union. In only 234 was there any competing union.
46 Professor Jaffe has forcefully pointed out that "By such legislation Congress has
bestowed functions of democratic government-though, withal, government-upon the members of industrial and railway labor. The representatives of a majority of the employees of
an employer determine by the collective bargain the conditions under which all are to
work." Jaffe, ''Law Making By Private Groups," 51 HARv. L. RBv. 201 at 234 (1937).
Professor Lenhoff cogently developed the theoi:y that the collective contracts made under
such statutes are enforceable because, "the recent labor acts resorted to the method of incorporating the terms of employment as filed by collective contracts of the described type.
Accordingly, it is the statute which regulates and rules the employment relationships in the
unit." LENHOFF, Tm, PRESENT STATUS oF CoLLECTIVE CoNTRACTs IN nm AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 1109, 1137 (1941).
_
47 "The increasing responsibilities placed on unions by governmental protection of their
democratic rights demand that they in turn accept the responsibility for democratic conduct
of their own affairs. An autocratic union, run without full participation of its members and
without leadership responsive to its membership, cannot morally claim democratic rights in
dealing with employers through the intervention of public agencies." AMERICAN CIVII.
LmERTillS UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 7 (1943).
A more legalistic statement of the proposition has been made by Professor Killingsworth: "Under the constitution the government must extend equal protection to all. It is
reasonable for the government to impose a similar requirement upon private organizations
when much of their power and authority are derived from public laws." Killingsworth,
"Restrictive State Labor Relations Acts," 1947 Wxs. L. RBv. 546 at 599. See also Dodd,
"Supreme Court and Organized Labor, 1941-5," 58 HARV. L. RBv. 1018 at 1039 (1945).
The governmental character of unions is emphasized by their own argument for the
union shop. They argue that just as all who receive the benefits of government are compelled to pay taxes, so all who accept the benefits obtained by the union should help pay
the cost. H unions are permitted by government to exercise the power of taxation, then
they should be compelled to protect the rights of those taxed. See GOLDEN AND RUTTENBBRG, DYNAMICS OF hmusTRIAL DEMOCRACY 213 (1942).
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The second and most compelling demand for democracy grows from
the very roots of unionism itself. The struggle for unionization is more
than an attempt to obtain economic benefits for workers, for unions are
more than brokers in the labor market. The struggle is also tD introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry, to provide workers a voice in determining the conditions under which they
work. 48 The preamble of the United Auto Workers constitution declares: "The organized worker seeks a place at the conference table ...
when decisions are made which affect the amount of food he and his
family shall consume, the education his children shall have and the
clothes they may wear." At the root of unionism is the demand that
the autocratic powers of management be leavened by a measure of industrial democracy. 49 This demand can be fulfilled only if unions
which sit at the bargaining table are themselves democratic. To the
extent that individuals are permitted to participate in forming union
policies, they are freed from submergence and become self-governing.
The reasons for union democracy provide a due to our central problem-the right of an individual in his union. The rights which a worker should have in the union which acts as his economic government are
essentially the rights of a citizen in a democratic state. Two of those
rights are crucial here. Most important is the right to participate fully
and freely in making the laws under which he lives. If this right of an
individual worker within his union is not protected, then collective bargaining has not brought him freedom but an additional master. Also
important is the right to equal and fair treatment. The individual must
not be arbitrarily discriminated against or imposed upon by a grasping
majority.
B. The Right to Participate

If the law is to protect the rights of individuals then it must first of
all protect his right to participate fully and freely in the union which
governs his working life. Just what this entails will become clear if we
evaluate the protection which the law has given this keystone right.
48 ''Workers organize into labor unions not alone for economic motives, but also for
equally compelling psychological and social motives, so that they can participate in making
the decisions which vitally affect them in their work and community life." GoLDEN AND
RurrnNllERG, DYNAMICS oF lNnusTRIAL DEMOCRACY 3 (1942).
49 "Fundamentally and ideally, collective bargaining is a process under which employees
actively participate, as equals, with employers in fixing the tenns and conditions of their
employment. Such participation of employees, through representatives of their own choosing
is visualized as a way to secure their genuine consent to the conditions under which they
work. •••" Co01rn AND MURRAY, ORGANIZBD LABoR AND PRoDucnoN 185 (1946).
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Three areas will be adequate to indicate the pattern of protection; admission to membership, expulsion from membership, and union
elections.

I. Admission to membership. Unions may bar individuals from
participation at the very threshold by denying them admission to full
membership in the union. Thus, the Locomotive Firemen exclude Negroes entirely, while the Boilermakers relegate them to auxiliary unions
which have no power but are governed by white locals. The Rubber
Workers exclude Communists, the Motion Picture Machine Operators
frequently admit only sons or close relatives of members, while the
Brewery Workers refuse to admit new members unless jobs are available. 110 Regardless of the form which exclusion takes, it has and is intended to have one or both of two results. It always bars unwanted
individuals or groups from participation in the activities of the union.
In conjunction with the closed shop or union preference contract, it
also controls who shall be entitled to work.
In deciding admission cases, the courts have almost unanimously
failed to protect the right to participate. Parroting njneteenth century
nonsense that a union is a fraternal order and free to choose its members,
they have consistently refused to compel unions to admit those for
whom they bargain. 51 On the other hand, the courts have vigorously
protected the so-called right to work by declaring that a union cannot
deprive a man of employment by refusing to admit him to membership.112
110 For a more complete description, see Summers, "Admission Policies of Unions," 61
EcoN. 66 (1946). As there stated, the number of unions engaging in exclusionazy
acts is relatively small. The great majority of unions are not only open to all who wish to
join, but they energetically seek new members. However, a substantial enough minority
restrict admissions to create a real problem.
111Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 17 N.E. (2d) 170 (1938). Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E. (2d) 677 (1941); Frank v. National Alliance of Bill
Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 99 A. 134 (1916); Muller v. Bricklayers Int. Union, 6 N.J. Misc.
226, 140 A. 424 (1928); Mayer v. Journeyman Stonecutters Assn., 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A.
492 (1890); Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N.Y.S. 442 (1924); Shein v. Rose,
12 N.Y.S. (2d) 87; Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 913 (1939); Colson v. Gelber,
80 N.Y.S. (2d) 448 (1948); Feinne v. Monahan, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) 24 L.R.R.M.
2588, Kelly v. Simons, 87 N.Y.S. (2d) 767 (1949).
112James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944); Bautista v.
Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1944); Williams v. International Brotherhood
of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. (2d) 586, 165 P. (2d) 903 (1946); Thompson v. Moore Drydock
Co., 27 Cal. (2d) 595, 165 P. (2d) 901 (1946); Blakeney v. California Shipbuilding Co.,·
(Cal. Super. 1945) 16 L.R.R.M. 793; Stockwell v. Vinstrand Theatres, Inc., (Cal. Super.
1941) 4 Lab. Cas. 60388; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters Trimmers Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26
A. 505 (1893); Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverer's Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 A.
720 (1938); Clark v. Curtis, 297 N.Y. 1014, 80 N.E. (2d) 536 (1948); Kelly v. Simons, 87
Q.J.
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This measure of protectiol) has surface appeal, hut it is based on
two false assumptions. First, it assumes that unions have no legitimate
interest in allocating job opportunities. But unions in bargaining for
seniority provisions do deprive some men of their jobs and give preference to others.53 Restricting admission under the closed shop does
nothing more. Carpenters shift frequently from job to job, so customary seniority clauses would be meaningless. A closed shop with a closed
union means simply that newcomers are excluded until older craftsmen
are employed. If more carpenters are needed new men are granted
work permits, hut when jobs become scarce they are humped by union
members. The closed union thus provides a rough form of industrial
seniority. 54
The problem is not whether unions shall he permitted to interfere with employment In accepting the right of unions to bargain about
seniority, we have recognized this power. Rather, the problem is
whether the union, in restricting admission, has abused its power by
establishing improper standards of job preference. The Brewery Workers, by refusing to admit new applicants while old members are out of
work, give preference to prior employees-an accepted criterion of preference.55 The Motion Picture Machine Operators, by admitting only
N.Y.$. (2d) 767 (1949); Wills v. Local 106, Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 26 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 435 (1927); Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 165 Ore. 602,
109 P. (2d) 600 (1941); Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886
(1939). For a more complete discussion of the legal limitations on exclusion see Newman,
"The Closed Union and the Right to Work," 43 CoL. L. REv. 42 (1943); Summers, "The
Right to Join a Union," 47 CoL. L. REv. 33 (1947).
r

Nor is seniority the only control over who shall work. Unions bargain concerning
apprenticeship requirements, work sharing, job transfers, and discriminations based on race
or sex and compulsory retirement-all directly controlling job opportunities.
Although the courts talk much of the ''right to work," it is clear that there is no such
right. No worker can compel anyone to give him a job. The determination of whether he
shall be allowed to work always lies in other's hands. Usually the employer controls his
job rights. The "right to work" is merely a slogan meaning that the union shall have no con·
trol. See GOLDEN AND Ru-1TENBERG, DYNAMICS OF lNnusTRIAL DEMOCRACY 193 et seq.
(1942); Vladek, "On the Sovereignty of Labor Unions,'' 1 !Nn. & LAB. REL. REv. 480
(1948).
54 During the depression the garment trades locals refused to accept new members
while old members were out of work. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNioN, DEMOCRACY IN
TRADE UNIONS 21 (1943). In many industries such as construction, longshore, and maritime, employment is not continuous for the same employer but consists of a series of short
term employments. Only through the closed union can any semblance of seniority be
enforced.
55Jn Ryan v. Hayes, 243 Mass. 168, 137 N.E. 344 (1922) the court permitted a union
to manipulate membership in preserving seniority rights. Ryan obtained a job in a closed
shop although he was not a member. When the union discovered this it demanded his discharge. He applied for membership and was accepted on the condition that he go to the
bottom of the work list. This resulted in his discharge. The court refused to grant relief
on the theory that when he joined the union he agreed to be bound by its rules.
58
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sons, apply a standard of nepotism-a questionable though common
practice in the business world. 56 The Plumbers, by excluding Negroes,
enforce a job preference based on race-an obnoxious standard whether
established by unions or by management. The courts, however, have
not restricted themselves to preventing abuses, but have given blanket
protection to the individual's job rights and ignored the union's legitimate interest in job allocation. 51
The second false assumption upon which legal rules are based is
that unions are private clubs, free to close their doors to unwelcome intruders. Thus, the absurd result that unions which have the power to
govern are free to deny the franchise to those governed. The right of an
individual to join the union which acts as his bargaining representative
is the right to participate in his government, and should be protected
as such. Company spies who seek to destroy, Communists who seek to
pervert, or dual unionists who seek to alienate-these may justifiably be
excluded. Their interests are antagonistic to the continued existence
of the union as an effective bargaining agent. The right to vote can be
made dependent on complete loyalty. But when the Railway and
Steamship Clerks shunt Negroes into non-voting auxiliaries, when
Electricians deny regular permit men· the right to vote, and when the
Newspaper Deliverers' exclude new employees-then the right to
participate has been wrongfully infringed.
Two recent New York cases have also touched on this problem. In Ryan v. Simons,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) 25 L.R.R.M. 2302, non-union employees with greater seniority
sought to enjoin their replacement by union members with less seniority. The court held
that the union could not cause their discharge out of line of industry seniority because of
non-membership in the union. In another case involving the same union (Newspaper and
Mail Deliverers) the court refused an injunction when it appeared that the men being
discharged were only part-time employees and they were being replaced by full-time em·
ployees. Costero v. Simons, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) 25 L.R.R.M. 2280).
56 In the absence of union control of hiring, jobs frequently go to those who have some
"pull" with officials or workers in the plant. There is no evidence that union practices are
substantially worse than employer practices-the choice merely rests in different hands.
In a survey of 100 presidents of large companies, it was found that only 32 were "selfmade," 16 had clearly inherited their jobs, and the other 52 had received substantial aid
from influential connections. CHAMBERLAIN, UNION CHALLENGE To MANAGEMENT CoNTROL 60-61 (1948). In the absence of union control, new jobs frequently go to those who
know the manager, a foreman, or some other worker.
57 The measure of the courts' unawareness of the union's interest is revealed in Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. (2d) 746, 155 P. (2d) 343 (1944). The union of Milk Drivers had
a closed shop which also provided that the distributors would not sell milk to anyone not
observing union conditions. Bautista was denied admission because he was an independent
peddler, and the union instructed jobbers not to sell to him. The court enjoined the union
from interfering with Bautista's work. It refused to recognize the _interest which the union
had in preventing its standards from being undermined by peddlers who worked for less than
union rates.
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These false assumptions have been carried into legislative provisions. 58 Thus sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Labor Management
Relations Act bar the union from using admission as a device for regulating employment, but give no protection to the right to participate. 59
Likewise, the Massachusetts statute protects only job rights and not
democratic rights, although it does permit a union to bar an individual
from a job for "bona fide occupational qualifications." 60
The hope for legal protection of the right to join is not entirely dead,
for there are slight signs of an awakening. 61 The most hopeful sign is
the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Betts v. Easley. 62 The
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen was certified as bargaining· agent under
the Railway Labor Act, but like the Boilermakers, it relegated Negroes
to auxiliary unions which had no power of self-government. The
court held that denial of equal right to participate "is repugnant to every
concept of equality" and is "abhorrent to both the letter and spirit of our
58 Legislative confusion undoubtedly reflects to a certain degree the scholarly suggestions. Almost without exception, writers on the subject have placed extreme emphasis on
the right to work and ignored the right to participate. See, for example, Newman, "The
Closed Union and The Right to Work," 43 CoL. L. REv. 42 (1943); Hammett, "The
Power of Trade Unions to Discipline Their M~bers," 96 Umv. PA. L. REv. 537 (1948);
Cox, "Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947," 61 HARV. L. REv.
271, 296 (1947); SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 119 (1947).
59 This disruption of orderly employment practices caused by these sections has been
suggested in Zorn, "New Union Responsibilities," FmsT ANNuAL CoNFERENCB ON Luion
RELATIONS, NBw YoRK UNIVERSITY 303 (1948). The devices created to circumvent the
statute reflect the deep felt need of unions to control hiring. Thus, the West Coast Shipowners contract provides that shipowners will give preference to applicants who formerly
worked on ships of any member company. Other unions tried to continue using hiring
halls open to union and non-union workers alike but assigning jobs on a rotation basis.
60 Massachusetts Labor Relations Act (1947) §§4 and 6 A. Colorado, Pennsylvania
and Wisconsin statutes also protect the right to work. The Pennsylvania statute, however,
goes beyond this and denies unions which exclude because of race, creed or color any protection or certification under the act.
61 In a number of cases, the courts have in effect prohibited taxation without representation. In James v. Marinship, 25 Cal. (2d) 721, 155 P. (2d) 329 (1944), the California court enjoined the Boilermakers from enforcing a closed shop against Negroes who
were admitted only to an auxiliary union. They had no voice in bargaining, no grievance
procedure, and no business agent, but were completely governed by a neighboring white
local in which they had no voice or vote. Although they had not been prevented from
working, the court enjoined the union from compelling payment of union dues. In a similar
vein, the Texas court in A. F. of L. v. Mann, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 276
upheld a statute outlawing work permits on the basis that it was improper for the union to
exact dues from those who had no voice in union policy. Likewise the New Jersey court
in Cameron v. International Alliance, 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 A. 692 (1935) enjoined the
union from restricting some workers to "junior" status without voice or vote; and a California court enjoined the Barbers union from picketing to compel a barber to join the union
when it was not willing to admit him to full active membership. Riviello v. Journeyman
Barbers, (Cal. App. 1948) 199 P. (2d) 400.
02 161 Kan. 459, 169 P. (2d) 831 (1946).

1951 ]

UNION POWERS AND WORKERS' RIGHTS

825

fundamental charter." It enjoined the union from acting as bargaining agent until it admitted Negroes to full membership. 63
In spite of such signs of hope, there is little reason to be optimistic. 64
Old ideas die hard, especially in the law. Until the courts and legislatures see clearly that at the heart of union democracy is the right of
an individual to vote in his economic government, there is little likelihood that the law will protect the right to join.
2. Expulsion from membership. In deciding union discipline cases,
the court's reasoning and results are entirely different, but reHect
the same misconceptions. If expulsion is improper, the court orders
reinstatement in the union and enjoins interference with the job. The
job and the vote are protected equally, although they are distinct interests entitled to different measures of protection. If a union member
works for less than the union scale, it may be proper to suspend his job
rights for a period, but it does not follow that he should also be disenfranchised. 65 On the other hand, if a member campaigns for a rival
68 Hopeful straws have also appeared in the legislative winds. Most important have
been the fair employment practice laws now passed in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island and Washington. These laws directly forbid
unions from excluding workers because of race, creed, color or national origin. Although
these laws operate within a limited scope, they do protect the individual's right to full
membership and participation.
64 In Courant v. International Photographers, (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 1000 the
court rejected the reasoning of Betts v. Easley. The excluded member, who was unable to
obtain work because of a closed shop contract, argued that since the union was certified by
the N.L.R.B., it was legally bound to admit him. The court held, however, that although
the union obtained its power to bargain from government, it was still a voluntary association
and had no obligation to open its membership.
Most disappointing of all has been the trend of the N.L.R.B. In Bethlehem-Almeda
Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 999 (1943) it suggested that a union which denied membership on the basis of race might be denied certification. However, in a series of cases the
board failed to find such discrimination although its presence was quite apparent. See
Carter Manufacturing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944); Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.
R.B. 973 (1945); Norfolk Southern Bus Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 488 (1948). Finally, in Balaban & Katz, 87 N.L.R.B. No. 143 (1949) the board distinguished away these cases to near
nothingness. In this case, the Motion Picture Machine Operators in Toledo refused to admit
several operators, keeping them as permit men for a number of years. These operators
organized an independent union and asked for a board election in one of the large theatres.
Although the evidence of discrimination both in employment terms and in union participation was present, the board rejected their plea to make this theatre a separate bargaining
unit so they might have a measure of self-government. Appropriate remedies for discrimination must be pursued under other provisions of the act and not in the representation
proceeding, said the board. For a more full analysis of the board's policy, see Aaron and
Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of the Internal Affairs of Unions," 44 h.r.. L. REV'. 425
at 438-42 (1949).
65 See Harmon v. Matthews, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 656 (1941) where the court upheld an
expulsion for violating the union scale. The more proper penalty would be either fine or
temporary suspension. This seems to be the normal practice of the Musicians. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WoRKS 860 (1941).
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union, that may justify excluding him from union activities, but it does
not justify his· discharge. 66 The courts have ignored this distinction,
for they have not sought to protect either interest, but have protected
membership as an independent right. 67
In establishing the standard of protection, the courts have likewise
ignored the interests to be protected. Instead, the courts have adopted
the theory that by joining a union, the individual enters into a contract, the terms of which are expressed in the union constitution and
by-laws. Whether an expulsion is proper depends on whether it is in
accord with the constitution. 68 This theory means that the law provides no protection of democratic rights within the union other than
those which the union itself is willing to permit. 69
The danger of the contract theory to free participation becomes apparent upon a survey of union constitutions. For example, the Railroad Trainmen prohibit the issuing of any circular or petition without
the permit of the president; the Electricians (A.F.L.) prohibit any political campaigning within the union; the Hodcarriers expel any member who "willfully slanders any officer"; and the Steel Workers punish
for "publishing or circulating among the membership false reports or
misrepresentations." Beyond these more specific clauses, the majority
of unions have general prphibitions against "conduct unbecoming a
union member," "causing dissension," or "creating disharmony:" Restricted by such provisions, members of the union can be deprived of
their freedom of discussion and protest. The political process within
<16 See Davis v. International Alliance, 60 Cal. App. (2d) 713, 141 P. (2d) 486 (1943)
where the court upheld an expulsion for promoting a rival union. In neither of these cases
is there any suggestion that the penalty should fit the crime. The only question the courts
will consider is whether the expulsion is proper.
67 This is at least in part due to the union's own failure to distinguish between the
two interests. Only rarely has a union insisted on discharge as a penalty without at the same
time suspending or expelling the offending member. For one of the rare cases, ·see O'Keefe
v. Local 463, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. (2d) 77 (1938). Occasionally a union may expel a
member but permit him to continue working under a closed shop, thereby protecting his
job rights. See Ames v. Dubinsky, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 706 (1947).
68 For explicit statements of the contract theory, see Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159,
176 N.E. 791 (1931); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931). In Smith v.
International Printing Pressmen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) 198 S.W. (2d) 729 it was held
that an action for damages for wrongful expulsion was subject to the statute of limitations
for breach of written contracts.
69 Dame, president of a local in the Telephone Guild, sent a letter to the Wisconsin
Telephone Company stating that the contract made by the executive board had not been
approved by the membership as required by the constitution. He was charged with revealing
union secrets, tried by the executive board without notice and expelled. The Wisconsin
court followed the contract theory with literalness, held the expulsion was in full compliance with the constitution, and refused to order reinstatement. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis.
146, 28 N.W. (2d) 349 (1947).
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the union can become sterile, and the right to participate a hollow
shell.70
Fortunately, not all courts have so blindly followed the contract
theory as to leave individuals without protection. A few hold courts
have declared oppressive discipline clauses void. Thus, in Schrank v.
Brown, the court enjoined expulsion of Machinists who had issued a
circular criticizing union officers.71 The court said, "Fair criticism is
the right of members of a union, as it is the right of every citizen. A
provision in the union constitution which would suppress protests of
members against their officers would be illegal and unenforceable."
Less bold but more crafty courts have subverted the contract theory to
provide protection of individual rights. In Jose v. Savage a member of
the Carpenters was expelled because he filed charges against the officers for misfeasance. The court ordered him reinstated because the
district council before which he was tried included three members who
had not been regularly elected but merely appointed to fill vacancies. 72
These did not comply strictly with the constitution so the expulsion was
void. In a substantial number of cases the courts have protected the individual's political rights within the union by narrowly interpreting
constitutional provisions,73 distorting the facts, 74 or discovering technical
procedural defects. 711
• ·
70 These are not exceptional, but common clauses, Seventy-four unions have clauses
which limit criticism of officers or fellow members, fifteen prohibit the issuing of circulars,
and ninety-six have some form of cover-all provision such as "conduct unbecoming a union
member." See Summers, "Disciplinary Practices of Unions," 4 hm. AND LAB. REL. R:Ev.
15 (1950). Although the number of expulsions by unions is relatively small in proportion
to the membership, the number is substantial enough to give most union members a healthy
respect for the dangers of getting very far out of line.
,
71 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S. (2d) 452 (1948). See also Grand International Brother•
hood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 S. 569 (1923); Reilly v. Hogan,
32 N.Y.S. (2d) 864 (1942).
12 123 Misc. 283, 205 N.Y.S. 6 (1924).
73 In Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S. (2d) 812 (1945) the court held that defying
orders of union officers by holding forbidden shop meetings with the members did not
constitute "conduct unbecoming a union member."
74 In Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N.Y.S. 28 (1935) members of Musicians
Local 802 called a meeting of the local in direct defiance of orders by the international. The
local rebelled against domination and control by the international, drew up a local constitu•
tion and elected officers. When the leaders of the movement were expelled the court ordered
reinstatement, naively explaining that there had been no disobedience but only a dramatic
demonstration of their desire for self-government. The rebellious leaders were informed by
the court that they hadn't really meant it but were only play-acting!
75 In Johnson v. International Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local 971, 52
Nev. 400, 288 P. 170 (1930), the court voided an expulsion of a member for making
offensive remarks about the officers because the charge with which he was served did not
specify the particular section of the constitution violated. In Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App.
Div. 238, 278 N.Y.S. 785 (1935), the court reversed an expulsion for slandering union
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This protection by subterfuge and the unwillingness to protect
openly the right of free participation leave dangerous pitfalls in the law.
Less sensitve judges, misled by dicta, blindly follow the contract theory
to its absurd conclusions. In Elfers v. Marine Engineers, a candidate
for union office issued a pamphlet attacking the incumbent officers for
failing to carry out the policies of the uni9n. He was expelled for "disclosing union business in public," and the court upheld the expulsion
as clearly within the constitution. 76 Thus, these timid and fiction-bound
courts hold that an individual in joining a union, surrenders his rights
of citizenship within the union. 77 He has no Bill of Rights within his
economic government.
The slowness of the courts to protect the right to participate is
more than matched by the legislatures. The only two substantial statutes, the Labor Management Relations Act and the Massachusetts Labor Relations Act, protect only job rights. 78 They do not prevent the
union from expelling a member and depriving him of his voice and
vote. To the extent that they protect the individual's job, they reduce
the severity of the penalty which the union can inflict, but this is not
enough to keep free the political processes within the union. In Hall v.
Morrin, officers of the St. Louis local of the Bridge Workers challenged
the dictatorial control of President Morrin. Morrin did not expel them,
or even interfere with their employment; he merely barred them from
holding office or attending union meetings for five years, and thereby
removed any threat of democratic revolt. 70
officers on the ground that the trial had not been before the proper trial body, even though
the special trial committee had been created for the ostensible purpose of avoiding having
him tried before the officers whom he slandered.
76179 La. 383, 154 s. 32 (1934).
77 See, for example, Love v. Grand Int. Bro. of Locomotive Engineers, 139 Ark. 375,
215 S.W. 602 (1919); Gaestel v. Brotherhood of Painters, 120 N.J. Eq. 358, 185 A. 36
(1936); Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W. (2d) 349 (1947).
78 Some attempts have been made by unions to circumvent the Taft-Hartley provisions
by including clauses in the contract which give the union power to initiate discharge proceedings. One such clause provides that the union can raise as a grievance the continued
employment of any "who engages in any violation of this agreement, or otherwise interferes
with the efficient operation of the employer's business, or with the harmonious relations
between the employer and the employees or among the employees." The union may appeal
such a grievance to arbitration. See Zorn, "New Union Responsibilities," FmsT AmmAL
Com:ERENCE ON LABOR RELATIONS, NEw Yorut UNIVERSITY 303 (1948).
79 (Mo. App. 1927) 293 S.W. 435 Ames was .a candidate for president of the International Ladies Garment Workers. He and his supporters charged the incumbent officers
with misuse of union funds, selling out to management, and other misconduct in office.
Ames was charged with slandering union officers and expelled. However, he was permitted
to continue working in union shops. Ames v. Dubinsky, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 706 (1947).
Kovner, in discussing this case, suggests that the campaigning was of the virulence common
in ideological battles between right and left wing factions. However he dismisses the case
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3. Union elections. In dealing with membership rights, the courts
have not given explicit recognition to the right to participate but have
been misled by outmoded fictions and dangerous theories. But when
the process of voting itself is involved, the courts have been more vigorous in giving at least formal protection. First, they have insisted that
unions hold elections. When President Moreschi of the Hodcarriers
took charge of Local 17 in New York City, prohibited the holding of
elections, and gave his lieutenant, Nuzzo, full control, the court ordered an election held under the supervision of the court. "The right
to membership in a union," said the court, "is empty if the corresponding right to an election guaranteed with equal solemnity in the fundamental law of the union is denied.... the member denied the right to
participate [in an election] is denied a substantial right which is neither
nebulous nor ephemeral."80
Second, the courts have insisted that the voting be conducted according to proper form. 81 In a number of cases the courts have voided
elections because they were held without proper notice,82 the ballot box
was stuffed,83 or the ballots were not properly counted. 84 In some instances the courts have supervised a recount of the ballots and declared
by saying the injury was not substantial because job rights were not disturbed. He completely ignores the fact that the effect of this discipline is to render practically powerless
the leadership of the opposition. Kovner, "Legal Protection of Civil Liberties Within
Unions," 1948 Wxs. L. Rsv. 18.
80 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 882 (1941). For the decree prescribing the conduct of the election, see 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S. (2d) 849 (1941).
In a number of cases the courts have ordered elections to be held under the supervision of a master, or have appointed receivers to take chai:ge of the local's affairs and conduct an election. Chambers v. International Hodcarriers, (D.C. D.C. 1943) 52 F. Supp.
978 (allege past elections illegal and international union controlling local); Webster v.
Rankin, (Mo. App. 1932) 50 S.W. (2d) 746 (officers of Hodcarriers ordered elections in
local postponed for one year); Harris v. Geier, 112 N.J. Eq. 99, 164 A. 50 (1932) (officers
appointed by district council, and elections repeatedly postponed); Local No. 11 of Int. Assn.
of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. McKee, 114 N.J. 555, 169 A. 351
(1933) (international appointed officers and suspended all meetings); O'Neill v. Journeymen Plumbers, 348 Pa. 531, 36 A. (2d) 325 (1944) (officers named by international and
no election for 12 years); Raevsky v. Upholsterers International Union, 38 Pa. D. & C. 187
(1940) (international president ordered local election postponed).
81 Thus, the California court voided the adoption of a new constitution by the Marine
Cooks. The old constitution prescribed in detail the procedure for amendment, but this
procedure was not followed. Instead, a constitutional convention was called and an entirely
new constitution proposed. The court found the procedure not in compliance with the old
constitution, and therefore void. (Cal. App. 1949) 24 L.R.R.M. 2459.
82 Fisher v. Kempter, (N.Y. Sup. 1949) 25 L.R.R.M. 2188.
83 Allis-Chalmers Local 248, U.A.W. v. Wis. Employment Relations Board, 8 L.R.R.M.
1148 (1941).
84 Siblia v. Western Electric Employees Assn., 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A. (2d) 251
(1948).
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the proper result. 85 The courts may look behind the form to determine
basic fairness. Thus, in Bucko v. Murray, the courts voided a union
referendum on a change in seniority lists when it became clear that the
only ones who were qualified to vote were the ones who would profit
from the change. 86
Third, the courts have shown some concern that decisions made by
the vote of the members not be overthrown or ignored. In 1942 the
Plumbers convention rejected a proposal to consolidate the locals in
and around Boston. However, two years later President Durkin ignored
this vote and ordered the consolidation. The court held that although
he had the general power to order consolidation, he could not use this
power to reverse the decision made by the convention.87 Similarly,
members of the Locomotive Firemen in three seniority districts voted
not to combine their seniority lists. VVhen the board of directors, in
spite of this vote, ordered the lists combined, the court enjoined the
board from enforcing its order. 88
In election cases, as in expulsion cases, the legal logic is based on
the contract theory. In these cases, however, the theory can be a positive
aid to the courts. 89 Most union constitutions are replete with provisions requiring elections and referenda, and the courts by rigorously enforcing these provisions can provide substantial protection to the political process. 90
Tobacco Workers Int. Union v. Weyler, 280 Ky. 355, 132 S.W. (2d) 754 (1939).
170 Misc. 902, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1939). However, the courts usually seem
more impressed with the form of the election rather than with its fairness. If the procedure
complies with the constitution, they hesitate to intervene unless fraud or imposition is
obvious. Stanton v. Harris, 152 Fla. 736, 13 S. (2d) 17 (1943); Rowan v. Rossehl, 173
Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 574 (1940); O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.
(2d) 833 (1938); Carey v. International Brotherhood of Papermakers, 123 Misc. 680, 206
N.Y.S. 73 (1924); Maloney v. District No. 1, UMWA, 308 Pa. 251, 162 A. 225 (1932).
87 Cameron v. Durkin, 321 Mass. 590, 74 N.E. (2d) 671 (1947).
88 Gleason v. Thomas, 117 W.Va. 550, 186 S.E. 304 (1936).
89 The contract theory, however, can becloud the issue. If the courts are so intent on
seeing whether the constitution has been followed, they may seek the form and ignore the
substance. For evidence that this happened in some cases, see the cases cited in note 86
supra.
90 Court interference in elections does not always produce corrective results. The union
member's antipathy for legal interference may actually solidify the control which the court
seeks to break. In Local No. 11 v. McKee, 114 N.J. 555, 169 A. 351 (1933), the election
ordered by the court was won by the very ones who had been dominating the union. Nine
years after the court had ousted officers from a stagehands local, for causes which it deemed
adequate, the same officers were back in power, apparently engaging in the same practices,
Collins v. International Alliance, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 A. 37 (1937); Gilligan v. Motion
Picture Machine Operators, 135 N.J. Eq. 484, 39 A. (2d) 129 (1944). For an excellent
discussion of this problem, see 51 YALE L.J. 1372 (1942). Several states have enacted
85

86
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In summary, it can be briefly stated that the law has granted almost
no explicit recognition of the right of an individual to participate fully
and freely in his economic government. In admission cases this failure
has been fatal, for it has diverted the law to restricting union job control
instead of requiring open membership so that this and other union
powers might be subject to the check of the democratic process. In
expulsion cases it has not prevented substantial protection by subterfuge, but that protection is so spotty and misleading that no member
can feel secure in exercising his democratic rights. Only in regulating
elections have the courts provided broad and clear protection, but this
is worth little if workers are not free to join the union, criticize its policies, and campaign for officers.

C. The Right to Equal Treatment
Even if the law did fully protect the right to participate within the
union so that majority will could freely operate, further protection of
the individual might still be needed. Runaway majorities may use
their power to discriminate arbitrarily against minority groups and obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of those too weak to resist.
It may be necessary for the law to protect politically impotent minorities from oppressive operation of majority will. Workers, like citizens,
are entitled to equal treatment by their government.
The United States Supreme Court, in the Steele and Tunstall
cases, explicitly recognized this right of equal treatrnent.91 The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen made collective agreements with the railroads which destroyed the seniority rights of Negro
Firemen and insured their ultimate elimination from the work. The
Court, in holding the agreement invalid, said:
statutes regulating election. The Minnesota Labor Union Democracy Act of 1943 requires
that elections be held according to the union constitution, be held at least every four years,
and that reasonable notice be given and secret ballot provided. The Colorado statute (now
invalid) requires that elections be held every year, that every member be eligible for office,
and that voting be done by secret ballot. For a criticism of these statutes, see Killingsworth,
''Restrictive State Labor Relations Acts," 1947 Wis. L. REv. 546.
01 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235
(1944). For some indication of the continuing struggle by Negroes to obtain adequate
relief, see Mitchell v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., (D.C. Ala. 1950) 26 L.R.R.M. 2151;
Aaron and Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of the Internal Affairs of Unions," 44 ILI.. L.
REv. 425 (1949).
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"We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes on the statutory representative of a· craft at least as exacting duty to protect
equally the interests of members of the craft as the Constitution
imposes upon the legislature to give equal protection to those for
whom it legislates." 92
Although the individual's right to equal treatment was expressly
affirmed, the precise scope of protection was left uncertain. The Court
agreed that the union could make distinctions ''based on differences
relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract" such as seniority,
skill, and type of work performed. But it refused to mark the allowable
limit of differences by saying, "discriminations based on race alone are
obviously irrelevant and invidious." During the 1930's the Railway
and Steamship Clerks amended their seniority agreements to deprive
married women of all seniority rights and thereby eliminate them from
jobs sought by men workers who were unemployed. The Michigan
Supreme Court held that this was within the union's power.93 Under
the Steele case, would this agreement be based on a relevant difference
or an invidious discrimination?
From the meager evidence available, there is reason to fear that the
lower federal courts may apply the Steele doctrine with mutilating narrowness. Thus, in the T railmobile case, the Sixth Circuit refused to find
that depriving the Highland employees of their seniority was discrimin?tory. 94 Ignoring the obvious oppression, the court disposed of the
problem by saying that the agreement was "not without some basis." If
such blatant exercises of majority power escape, then little protection
exists against the more subtle discriminations available.95
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 202, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944).
Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W.
885 (1938).
94 Trailmobile Co. v. Britt, (6th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 569. For other cases where
the federal courts have failed to find discrimination under the Steele doctrine, see Elder v.
New York Central R. Co., (6th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 361; Llewellyn v. Fleming, (10th
Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 211; Kordewick v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, (7th Cir.
1950) 26 L.R.R.M. 2164.
95 The most subtle form of discrimination occurs in the handling of grievances. In the
railroad car shops, grievance committees of the white locals have frequently refused to hear
complaints filed by Negroes. CAYTON AND MITCHELL, BLACK WORKERS AND THB NBw
UNIONS 298 (1939). In Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, (5th Cir. 1945) 147 F. (2d) 69
the court indicated that a refusal to handle grievances by the representative union would
constitute unlawful discrimination.. However, there is no evidence that the courts are
anxious to apply this dotcrine.
The danger of discrimination against Negroes on the railroads is enhanced by the fact
that the National Railway Adjustment Board, to which the final appeal is made, is dominated by the all-white brotherhoods. This board has power not only over grievances but
jurisdictional disputes, and it has repeatedly permitted the white unions to take advantage
92
93
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The Ninth Circuit has further limited the protection provided.
Courant, a motion picture photographer, was unable to obtain work because the stagehands had a closed shop and refused to admit new members. He sought relief in the federal courts on the grounds that he was
being discriminated against by a certified bargaining agent. The court
denied him any relief, holding that the union's duty not to discriminate
extended only to those already employed in the bargaining unit. 96 It
owed no duty to those who sought employment in the unit. In short,
by barring them from entry, it could escape any responsibility to them.
The danger of discrimination is obviously greater where individuals
or groups are excluded from the union and are therefore unable to exert influence through the political processes of the union. However,
even members are not free from dangers. The married women who were
routed from their jobs were full members of the union, but they were
hopelessly outnumbered by men who sought their jobs. The Highland
men were not excluded from the T railmobile local, but they were helpless to protect themselves.97 Even if Negroes were admitted to the railroad brotherhoods, there is no certainty that they would escape discrimination.
.
Whenever clearly defined minorities are contained within the bargaining unit, there is danger that their interests will be appropriated by
grasping majorities. This danger is particularly great when seniority is
involved, for the interests of groups within the shop conflict and the
fear of lay-off is great. 98 Although the law must permit unions wide
latitude in negotiating contracts, it ought not tum a deaf ear on those
who are victimized by unions which fail to accept responsibilities commensurate with their powers. No precise standards are possible, but
of the Negro workers. The courts have given no substantial relief. See the excellent discussion of this problem in Aaron and Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of Union Affairs,"
44 ILL. L. REv. 425 at 428-35 (1949).
96Courant v. International Photographers, (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 1000. There
is also a question as to the extent of the Steele doctrine to non-statutory bargaining. If a
union is bargaining under the jurisdiction of a labor relations act, but is not certified, it can
be strongly urged that it is receiving the benefit of the statute even though it lacks the official stamp of authority. However, if the bargaining is outside the scope of any such statute,
then the union's claim of being a private agency becomes more plausible.
97 This discrimination took place in the United Auto Workers, one of the more democratic unions, and apparently contrary to usual union policies. Shortly after this the Ford
contract was amended to require that when an operation was moved to another plant, the
employees would move with the job taking their full seniority. 1945 Contract, Art. Vill,
§6. The Chrysler contract also provided that when work was transferred to another plant,
employees may transfer carrying their seniority to the other plant. 1945 Contract, Art. IV,
§12.
98 See Gregory, "The Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements by Arbitration,"
13 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 445 (1946).
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at least the closeness of scrutiny should be proportionate to the degree
of danger.

D. Complicating Considerations
In all of this discussion we have defined the relationship between
the union and the individual as a relationship between a bargaining
agent and the worker for whom it bargains-the relationship between
economic government and the individual governed. This is necessary,
for the central function of unions is to bargain collectively, and to that
function all else is subordinate.
However, unions are more than bargaining agents. They are also
political action organizations, mutual benefit societies, educational institutions and social clubs. Union membership is a complex web of relationships with widely varying rights and duties, and the individual's
place in these other activities is essentially different from that involved
in collective bargaining. We are faced, therefore, with the problem of
determining how these other functions of unions alter the individual
rights which we have previously discussed. The study of one function,
political action, will suffice to indicate the nature of the problem and to
suggest the direction toward solution.
Since 1828 when a few infant qnions organized the Workingmen's
Party, unions have sought to achieve some of their objectives by legislation. They have sought by legislation to protect themselves from attack by passage of such laws as the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wagner
Act, and now by repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. They have sought by
legislation to obtain terms of employment which they could not obtain
by collective bargaining-thus, child labor laws, minimum wage laws,
and safety legislation. They have sought by political action to obtain
general social legislation such as price control, public housing, and
medical insurance. 99
Our problem is not whether unions should engage in political action, or what objectives they should seek. We are solely concerned with
the relationship between the union and the individual when it does
engage in political action for these objectives. More precisely, our
99 Painters have sought to outlaw spray-guns, plumbers and electricians have obtained
licensing and inspection laws, shipyard workers have advocated a large navy, merchant
marine and railroad unions have opposed the St. Lawrence Seaway and utilities workers
have opposed public ownership of utilities. For more full description of the political activities
of unions, see BARBASH, LABoR UNIONS IN AcnoN (1948); DANKERT, CONTEMPORARY
UNIONISM (1948); PETERSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS (1945).
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problem is whether, and to what extent, the union can bind the individual by its choice of political policy.100
In 1940 the Railroad Trainmen voted in convention to support President Roosevelt for a third term. Pfoh, who was past president of the
Cleveland lodge, opposed the third term and actively supported Willkie.
When a letter urging Willkie's election and signed by Pfoh was sent to
a number of local members, he was charged with issuing circulars without approval of the president. Although acquitted by his local union,
he was found guilty by the board of directors and expelled. The Ohio
Court of Appeals found the expulsion to be squarely within the union
constitution and declared it valid.101 An Illinois court, however, took a
different view in a similar case. Morgan, one of the organizers and a
shop steward in the Electrical Workers (C.I.O.) objected to political
action by the union. When the union voted to support Democratic
candidates, he not only refused to cooperate, but in a quixotic gesture
attempted to counteract the union's position by handing out Republican
literature. He, too, was expelled, but the court refused to countenace
this curtailment of his political freedom and ordered him reinstated.102
The union undoubtedly has an interest in who is elected to public
office, an interest which both Pfoh and Morgan were undermining. If
the union were only a political organization, it would be entitled to eject
those who sought to defeat its choice. But the unions here did more
than that. They disenfranchised local leaders in their economic government, because those leaders disagreed. The unions used their positions
as bargaining agents to inflict penalties for political nonconformance.
The unions asserted not merely the right to persuade but the power to
conscript political agreement, and sought to curtail the free discussion
100 It is clear that a union cannot use its discipline power to prevent a member from
canying out specific citizenship obligations. The Barbers were enjoined from expelling a
member who arrested a fellow member in enforcing Sunday closing laws, Manning v.
Klein, 1 Pa. Super. 210 (1896); the Plumbers were prevented from expelling a member,
who, as a public official, refused to appoint another member as plumbing inspector, Schneider
v. Local Union, No. 60, 116 La. 270, 40 S. 700 (1905).
The Locomotive Engineers were compelled to reinstate a member who testified before
the Interstate Commerce Commission against safety devices sought by the union, Abdon v.
Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929); and other unions have been ordered to
reinstate members who testified against the union in court. A. Angrisani v. Stearn, 167
Misc. 731, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 701 (1938); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
41 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 91 S.W. 834 (1905).
101 Pfoh v. Whitney, (Ohio App. 1941) 62 N.E. (2d) 744;
102Morgan v. Local 1150, 16 L.R.R.M. 720 (1945) reversed 331 Ill. App. 21, 72
N.E. (2d) 59 (1946) because of failure to exhaust internal appeals. Similarly the Pennsylvania court ordered reinstatement of a Trainman who was expelled for signing a petition
for repeal of the Full Crew Law. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113
A. 70 (1921).
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of issues and the active support of candidates. The union's interest is
not sufficient to justify such a restriction of our democratic processes.
This is not to say that unions ought to be barred from political
action. It only argues that the union ought not be allowed to compel
conformance of individuals by threatening their right to participate in
their economic government.
When the union seeks to compel contributions for political purposes, the problem becomes more difficult. In a celebrated case, the
union expelled Cecil B. DeMille because he refused to pay an assessment levied to fight an anti-closed shop amendment. The California
court upheld the expulsion as within the union's constitutional
power.103 Here there was no restraint on political activity or restriction
on the free play of.democratic forces. Rather, the issue was whether
DeMille's right to participate in the collective bargaining functions of
the union could be conditioned on his helping finance political activity
with which he violently disagreed. This does not amount to compulsory conformance, but it does amount to compulsory contribution to
political causes. A private poll tax for such ends is difficult to justify.
It is submitted that political organizations should be wholly voluntary and devoid of any power to compel conformance or contribution.
Unions ought be no exception. If they choose to engage in both collective bargaining and political action, they ought not be permitted to so
mix their functions that the right to participate in bargaining is conditioned upon compliance with political decisions. It is precisely this
severance of functions which is required by section 304 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. That provision prohibits unions which
act as collective bargaining agencies from making political contributions
or expenditures.104 This has not barred unions from political action,
but has merely compelled them to create separate political organizations
103 DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. (2d) 139, 187 P. (2d)
769 (1947). The expulsion was upheld even though it seriously interfered with DeMille's
working due to the prevalence of closed shop contracts. For a companion case, see Warner
v. Screen Office Employee's Guild, 16 L.R.R.M. 544 (1945).
104 In C.I.O. v. United States, 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948) the Supreme
Court evaded the constitutional issue and held that this provision did not prohibit unions
from supporting candidates in union n~wspapers, or from reprinting and distributing free
thousands of copies containing the union endorsement. It has also been held that a
union does not violate the statute by buying newspaper space and radio time to oppose a
candidate for office. United States v. Painters Local, No. 481, (1st Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d)
854.
A broad Massachusetts statute prohibiting political contributions or expenditures was
declared unconstitutional in Bowe v. Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E. (2d) 115
(1946) but a narrower Texas statute prohibiting only contributions was upheld. A.F. of L.
v. Mann, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 276.
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such as the PAC and the LLPE which have no disciplinary power over
workers but are supported solely by voluntary contributions.105
This device in the political function is analogous to one used by the
Railroad Trainmen in the insurance function. Recognizing that some
offenses which might justify expulsion would not justify forfeiture of
valuable insurance rights, they have provided that although a member
is expelled he can continue paying dues and thereby maintain his policy.106 Both devices point the direction toward the solution of other
complex problems created by the manifold functions of unions. Insofar
as the right of an individual in one function is improperly impaired by
the union's demand in another, then the two functions should be sufficiently severed to permit them to operate without conflict. No subsidiary activity should be permitted to impair the individual's central rightthe right to participate in collective bargaining.
Conclusion

I have not attempted to delineate precisely the powers of a union
over an individual, or the rights of an individual within his union. Nor
have I attempted to touch on many of the intricate problems of intraunion affairs-the power of union officers, the financial responsibility
of unions, or the parent local relationship. I have wholly omitted any
discussion of the difficult question of what legal remedies can be effective to protect union democracy. The purpose in this paper has been
to examine the essential character of the relationship between the union
and the individual worker, and to suggest some of the individual rights
which that relationship demands.
The thesis is simple and almost painfully obvious. Unions, under
the protection and authority of the law, govern the lives of individual
workers, controlling their jobs, regulating their conduct, and determining their economic welfare. Unions are the workers' economic govern1 05 Serious practical and constitutional difficulties are raised by requiring the union to
separate these functions. Prohibiting political assessments serves no purpose, for unions
can merely raise their dues and use money from the dues dollar. Prohibiting union newspapers and publications is unthinkable, and censoring them for political material would be
unbearable. Rather than endanger constitutional freedoms, it might be better to prohibit
only contributions to campaign funds and leave unions free to publicize as they wish. The
ability of a member to use the democratic processes within the union to oppose such activities gives some assurance against excesses.
lOG Refunding of the cash surrender value was found an inadequate solution as the
expelled member might be unable because of age or health to obtain other insurance. A
number of railroad brotherhoods have created separate benefit departments, but they
have not made general provision for separate membership. Usually expulsion from the
union results in forfeiture of the insurance.

838

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 49

ment, and only through them can individuals have any voice in making
the laws under which they work. Only if unions are democratic do
workers become self-governing.
·
Although the law has granted the union extensive power over the
individual, it has failed to recognize and protect the central right in a
democracy-the right of an individual to participate fully and freely in
the government under which he lives.

